INDEFINITE ISO
Jose Antonio Custodio

Half a Century of Insurgency.

For half a century, the Armed Forces of the Philippines has been involved in internal security operations against one form of rebellion after another. Adversaries throughout this period are numerous and did pose or are still posing serious challenges not only to the AFP but to the Philippine Republic as well. The Huk Rebellion of the early fifties, the Kamlon rebellion in the South in the late fifties, the upsurge of banditry in Mindanao in the sixties that was immediately followed by the Moro Rebellion that began in late 1972, the new communist threat posed by the CPP-NPA-NDF that began in the late sixties and finally the newest challenges posed by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group.

The question then begs to be asked is "Why has the Philippines been continuously been plagued by insurgencies?"  Instead of disappearing it seems that these insurgencies have been spreading throughout the country. As an example, the CPP-NPA was a miniscule and insignificant force when it first started and then due to the misrule of Ferdinand Marcos grew to a phenomenal 30,000 strong guerrilla army. The assumption of the Aquino administration saw a decline in the numbers until by the time of the Ramos presidency they could barely muster 5,000 men. Yet, during that same period, they set in motion a serious re-examination that has made them recover their lost momentum. They now number 10,000 plus fighters.

Add to that, the 13,000 guerrillas belonging to the MILF and the 200 to 2,000 Abu Sayyaf depending on the source of the estimate on the numbers of that particular bandit group.

In any case, gauging the strength of a guerrilla group is not done through a comparison of official strengths but on the area that they influence and the effect it has on the Philippine government. As an example, the CPP-NPA strength is approximately the same as compared to the Huks of the 1950s, but whereas the latter was concentrated mainly in Central Luzon they were not felt elsewhere and thus made them an easier target for the AFP. The CPP-NPA has learned to disperse their strength and thus force the government to equally disperse their own limited resources.

Thus, a 150,000 strong AFP backed by numerous territorial reserve units such as the CAFGU finds it difficult to defeat the 10,000 strong NPA while the 1950s AFP that numbered 30,000 defeated a 10,000 strong Huk guerrilla army.

Sad to say, the CPP-NPA-NDF is not the only guerrilla group as there are also the MILF and the ASG that now vie for attention and are in a way complementing each other by diverting AFP units and assets. In fact, the strategic situation now when one views the insurgency threat facing the country is a source of great concern in many ways. When Marcos declared Martial Law in 1972, he did that because of the alleged threat of rebellion. One then begins to wonder what barely a thousand CPP-NPA could do against the armed might of the state that was the basis for that declaration. Some claim that very declaration sort of speeded things up with the communists getting legitimacy for their questionable cause, and the MNLF launching their rebellion a few months after Martial Law. In comparison, the insurgents today of whatever shade and hue have managed to penetrate throughout the country and sabotage the economy and hold many of our countrymen in fear.

The AFP itself has been severely affected by insurgency in that it has deteriorated as one of the regions weakest militaries despite a large budgetary outlay. Instead of going to capability enhancement programs, the funds go to maintaining what may seem to be endless operations against the insurgents. Everything within the AFP has been stunted by this prolonged involvement in ISO.

Take the Philippine Marines Corps as an example. The PMC could have been developed as a lethal force for external defense purposes. Equipped with the proper weapons and training, they could be a formidable power projection force that would make any aggressor think twice before doing any mischief in our territories. The PMC would be used to make rapid amphibious assaults against the homeland of an external threat.

Instead, the PMC is all but an amphibious force for power projection. At best, it functions as heavy infantry tied down in territorial garrison duties in Mindanao and Sulu. Duties that are an anathema to the concept and principles of a Marine Corps.

So, the question then is what causes this?

Roots of Insurgency.

It is said that the root of an insurgency is a failed and flawed economic program. One may wish to add other things such as social justice, religious rights and whatever. In other words, it then becomes clear that an insurgency is but a symptom of a larger social malaise. Solving that social malaise then becomes urgent in order to arrest the steady spiral into endless military operations.

During the Vietnam War, there was a favorite comment among the top leadership of the US that went "We are beginning to see the light at the end of the tunnel." This was because of the impressive body counts that resulted from the various operations that caused huge losses among the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong. Unfortunately, the "light at the end of the tunnel" that in reality meant that windows of opportunity were opened to address the social issues that bred insurgency in South Vietnam due to battlefield success was never fully exploited. Instead, the "light at the end of a tunnel" turned out to be that of an approaching train as the NVA and VC were able to outlast the US and obliterate South Vietnam in 1975.

That is then why we today have adopted as some sort of mystical mantra the "Total Approach Concept". All that this means is that under the framework of clear, hold, consolidate and develop the military will punch a way through in order for other government agencies to establish the necessary means for progress in rebel territories and elsewhere.

However, despite such concepts, the insurgents are still alive and kicking. Does that mean then that AFP operations now against the insurgents despite racking up a number of impressive victories such as that against the NPA in Marag Valley and the recent campaign against the MILF camps in Central Mindanao are just mirrors of the American military operations in Vietnam? The use of military force is a necessity especially against an intransigent armed opponent. However, such use must not be prolonged as it eventually results in more and more negative effects. Military action must be automatically followed by rehabilitation and development and most importantly by reform.

One does not win the sympathy of people by just rebuilding their houses or helping them plant their crops or making roads for them, but by ensuring them that they will live in a new era of freedom and security against those who wish to oppress and exploit them. People join rebels not only because they are hungry, but also because an authority figure in the community was abusive. Perhaps molested their relatives, killed their children or grabbed their land. Personal grievances born of injustice are very powerful forces in motivating people to rebel.

Thus, when we say that a flawed economic policy is the root of insurgency what we really mean is that an oppressive social structure is the real root of this disease. What else will cause a flawed economic policy that will cause suffering? What else will compound that with abuses that then cause personal grievances to those reeling under the effects of poverty? Battlefield victories do not matter in this regard. They can only be solved through steady and consistent reforms that will create the image that the government whether it be national or local is truly looking after the welfare of the people.

The Future.

The recent campaign against the MILF has indeed resulted in the eradication of all their camps. It has also resulted in the dispersal of the MILF. If the issue is not resolved through immediate reforms and development, the AFP will find itself being sucked into a situation in Mindanao reminiscent of the US in Vietnam. Granted of course that the MILF has the brains to conduct a guerrilla struggle with the finesse of the CPP-NPA. Those, in combination with a renewed offensive by the communists are sure to make things challenging for the government.

However, there indeed is a window of opportunity that if properly used will result in the breaking of this vicious cycle of internal security operations. There is not much time left, as the country cannot afford another generation of fratricidal conflict. We have had at least three generations experiencing such conflict since the end of the Second World War. If not, it then becomes possible that by the year 2020, the communists might march into Malacanang while an Islamic state would be established in parts of Mindanao and Sulu.